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Many of the reasons given for why Russia is in Syria could be part of the
general spectrum of things – they are neither completely false nor
completely true – yet they all sidestep history as an unfounded phenomenon.
They paint an ingenious yet delusional picture of a foreign intruder
coming out of nowhere to the aid of an internal despot, while ignoring
the fact that the relations of cooperation between Syria and Russia were
established literally as the former gained independence from the French
and thereby became a modern nation-state.

According to analysts, cooperation between the USSR and Syria strengthened
in the 1960s and1970s when the Soviets helped to develop Syria’s national
industries, including the oil, agriculture and transportation sectors.
Soviet scientists, engineers and military instructors were among the
workforce dispatched to Syria, along with weapons, machinery, and other
equipment, experts said.

With the blessing of Hafez Assad, Bashar Assad’s father who was then president,
Moscow opened its naval base in Tartus in 1971, establishing a Soviet
military foothold in the Middle East.

The Soviet-era facility is operated under a 1971 agreement by Russian personnel.
Since 1992 the port has been in disrepair, with only one of its three
floating piers operational. Russia’s naval supply and maintenance site
near Syria’s Mediterranean port of Tartus will be modernized to accommodate
heavy warships after 2012, the Russian Navy chief said on 02 August 2009.
“Tartus will be developed as a naval base. The first stage of development
and modernization will be completed in 2012,” Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said,
adding it could then serve as a base for guided-missile cruisers and
even aircraft carriers.

Russia has been a major arms supplier to Syria since the Soviet era
and political cooperation with Damascus has often been far more valuable
to Moscow than money. In 2005, Russia wrote off more than 70 percent of Syria’s
$13-billion debt, much of which was the result of Soviet-era arms deliveries.

Syria, which was the Soviet Union’s main strategic ally in the Middle East
throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, was simply dropped out of the list of
Moscow’s foreign policy priorities in the early 1990s. Damascus perceived the
break-up of the U.S.S.R., along with Moscow’s decision to renounce global
confrontation with Washington and the restoration of Russian-Israeli
diplomatic relations in 1991, as a betrayal of the Arab world’s interests
and as a global Zionist conspiracy.

Damascus believed this 19 years ago, and many Syrians still think the
same way. However, the most pragmatic members of the Syrian political
elite headed by President Bashar al-Assad have always aspired to have
business and military cooperation with Moscow and have counted on Russia’s
political support on the Middle East peace settlement. Syria’s main
demand within this peace process is for the return of the Golan Heights,
occupied by Israel during the Six-Day War in 1967.

Historically; the USSR did not share the introduction of Syrian troops to
Lebanon in 1976, something, about which the Soviets were neither consulted
nor informed. In general the Syrian vision over Lebanon (part of Greater Syria),
or its contacts with Hezbollah in the 1980s could not be shared with Moscow.
Moscow would also understand the Syrian enmity towards Iraq as damaging to
the Arab cause. The level of closeness between Syria and the USSR also
diminished the possibilities of Soviet policies in Iraq. The Soviets
did not have a real desire to partake in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, as
they were reluctant to risk detente with the United States. So while they
were clearly not happy with the Arabs for risking what they had going on-
they were still obligated to contribute in microscopic portions – like
transporting Moroccan units to the line of fire in the Levant for example.
While the Soviet Union would eventually place the PLO as a lever on
anti-imperialism, they did not exactly see eye to eye with Syria on this
question. After the attack to the Palestinian movement by the Syrian army
in October 1976, only the Soviet Committee of the Afro-Asian Solidarity
reacted with a declaration in which it stated it did not understand why
Syria attacked its natural allies in the struggle against imperialism.
While the Soviet Union did not agree with Syria’s actions, the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union did not risk jeopardizing their relationship either.

In 1980, Moscow and Damascus signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation,
establishing specific strategic ties. The two nations fell out slightly in 1985
over disagreements related to the Palestinian cause (the Soviets backed the
Palestine Liberation Organization, Syria did not) and the Iran-Iraq war
(Syria supported Iran). But by the late 1980s, the friendship was back on
track with Moscow continuing to provide Damascus with economic and
military aid.

The ice in Russian-Syrian relations in the 1990s began to thaw in January 2005,
after Bashar al-Assad paid his first visit to Moscow, which resulted in
Russian then-President Vladimir Putin writing off 73% of Syria’s former
Soviet debts ($9.8 billion) in exchange for new guaranteed Russian weapons
contracts.

Russian-Syrian bilateral trade almost doubled over the next five years,
reaching $1 billion in 2009. Apart from the Russian military, oil and gas
companies and other businesses are also interested in the Syrian market.
A month ago, Russia’s oil and gas company Tatneft and its Syrian partners
started developing the South Kishma oilfield in the province of Deir ez-Zor.
In December 2009, Stroytransgaz, the oil and gas engineering and construction
company, built and commissioned a large gas refinery near the city of Hims,
located 160 km from Damascus.

Syria and Russia signed a cultural cooperation program for 2010-2012 in
Damascus on 21 March 2010. The document signed by Russian Culture Minister
Alexander Avdeyev and his Syrian counterpart Riyad Naasan Agha is based on
a basic intergovernmental agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation
concluded between Moscow and Damascus in 1995. President of Russia Dmitry
Medvedev, who was on a 2-day visit in Damascus in May 2010, said that Russia
is seeking more active trade cooperation with Syria. “Though the global
economic crisis has affected our bilateral trade turnover, we hope to improve
the situation”, the Russian leader said speaking in the Syrian capital.

Assad’s main objective is to enlist Moscow’s political support on the issue
of returning the strategic Golan Heights, a plateau 60 km long and 25 km wide,
from which the Syrian capital can be clearly seen.

Russian warships were sent to the military base -(TARTAUS)- in Syria in December
2011.
The fleet was led by the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov. Included also
are a patrol vessel and other vessels. The Russian government announced that
from December, a flotilla of warships will be sent to the naval base that
it has in Syria. The authorities affirmed that the fleet will be led by
the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov and also have a patrol vessel,
an anti-submarine ship, and other vessels. “The sending of the Russian
ships to Tartus should not be seen as a reaction to what is happening
in Syria (…) This was already planned from 2010, when there were no
such events existing there. It has not been an active preparation, and
there is no need to cancel or postpone it,” insisted the spokesman,
who explained that the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov also will
visit Beirut, Genoa and Cyprus.

The unwillingness of Russia and China, both permanent UN Security Council
members, to clearly condemn the Syrian regime for its brutal onslaught
against demonstrators prevented the Council from passing a strong
resolution on Syria that would further isolate the Assad regime,
already under U.S. and EU sanctions. Instead, the Council only issued
a presidential statement – a relatively mild, non-binding document –
more than four months into the uprising, calling on Assad to put an
end to violence and begin talks with the opposition.

The UN Security Council won`t tolerate military intervention in Syria,
Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during a January 2012
press-briefing. “If the opposition refuses to hold talks with the regime
in Damascus, it does not mean that bombing is necessary”, Mr. Lavrov said.
Commenting on his country`s position on the proposed resolution, he said
that Moscow did not insist on Assad to remain in power, but believed that
Syrians should decide on their own whether he should step down or stay
in office. Russia said that it will only support the Security Council
resolution on Syria if it contains Russia’s principal approaches to the
Syrian settlement. They include the unacceptability of any violence,
the beginning of a dialogue between the authorities and the opposition,
as well

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http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-russia-assad-soviet-defeat-nazis-anniversary-putin-relations-a7724641.html